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Abstract: In this chapter I look into epistolary narratives of women political 
theorists and activists and explore links between politics as action and love as 
an existential force. My discussion is framed within Hannah Arendt’s 
conceptualization of narratives within the political and draws on my research 
with Rosa Luxemburg’s letters to her comrade and lover Leo Jogiches. While I 
emphasise the importance of epistolary narratives in carrying traces of 
Luxemburg’s political and amorous discourse, I also point to the limitations of 
working with edited and translated collections of letters. What I argue is that 
letters as political narratives are crucial in enacting plurality and 
communication and that Luxemburg’s letters to her lover and comrade 
intensify rather than obscure the force of the political in re-imagining the 
future.  
 
 
 
‘No, I can’t work any more. I can’t stop thinking of you. I must write to you.’1 
This is the opening phrase of a love letter that starts agonistically: the urge to 
write to the beloved is posited as a dire need. The thought of the lover is 
juxtaposed to the imperative of work, but the latter, important as it is, seems 
to recede. After all the letter writer is Rosa Luxemburg, a revolutionary a 
Marxist, a leading figure of the socialist movement of her times, but also a 
woman in love. Luxembourg has been a controversial figure for many reasons 
and on many grounds.2 But for many of us, who came of age in the wake of the 
European social movements of the 70s, ‘when hopes were green [and] the 
revolution around the corner’ (Arendt, 1968:37), Luxemburg was mostly an 
inspiring figure, a living example of the strength of politics not just in changing 
the world but also and perhaps more importantly in revolutionising the ways we 
lived and the ways we loved.  
 
But what is the meaning of love and how is it related to politics and narratives? 
These are some of the questions that I want to explore in this chapter by 
following lines of Luxemburg’s letters to her lover and comrade Leo Jogiches. 
Despite their personal character, Luxemburg’s letters to Jogiches are political 
narratives par excellence; and yet it took years for these letters to be read and 
recognised as such. Luxemburg was demonised after her murder both by her 
former socialist comrades as well as by the black forces that dominated the 
European political terrain in the interwar and postwar periods. But while the 
anti-Luxemburg campaign was in full swing the publication of her prison letters 
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created ‘an event’ that was to break the silence and oblivion that had followed 
her murder (Cedar and Cedar, 1923). Arendt has argued that the poetic beauty 
of these letters was catalytic in destroying ‘the propaganda image of 
bloodthirsty Red Rosa’ (1968: 36). But these letters also gave rise to a similarly 
problematic discourse of Luxemburg as ‘a bird-watcher and lover of flowers, a 
woman whose guards said good-by to her with tears in their eyes when she left 
prison’ (1968: 36-37). This is the nature of political narratives after all: they 
are always in an agonistic relation with their times, they always carry 
ambiguous meanings and set in motion effects that can never be predicted or 
controlled. Reading political narratives thus involves an understanding of their 
conditions of possibility, which is what I want to do next by looking at 
biographical traces of the Luxemburg-Jogiches relationship, ‘one of the great 
and tragic love stories of Socialism’ according to her biographer (Nettl, cited in 
Arendt, 1968: 45).  
 
Luxemburg was twenty years old when she met Jogiches in Zurich in 1890 and 
he was three years older than her. They had fled their birth countries, Poland 
and Lithuania respectively—both under Russian rule at the time—and were 
heavily involved in socialist politics. There were strong links but also significant 
differences between them. Apart from being young, Jewish, exiled from their 
countries and working in the same political circles,3 they were also both 
studying at the University of Zurich between 1890 and 1897. Luxemburg 
published her doctoral thesis The Industrial Development of Poland in 1898, 
but Jogiches never completed his own, despite Luxemburg’s fervent 
endeavours to persuade him to do so. On top of being a tireless political 
activist, Luxemburg was an inspiring theorist and an eloquent writer; but she 
would always send her speeches, essays and books to Jogiches whose 
judgement she would trust in evaluating both her theoretical and political 
ideas and writings: ‘you don’t know that everything I do is with you in mind. 
Always when I write an article, my first thought is you’ll be thrilled by it’4 she 
wrote on 6 March 1899 from Berlin.  
 
Jogiches was not just a critical reader but also an excellent political organizer; 
coming from a wealthy family he was also a constant source of funding both for 
‘the cause’ and the relationship. Although they stayed together for fifteen 
years, Luxemburg and Jogiches only spent short times living together and even 
when they did, they never really cohabited, keeping different albeit 
neighbouring apartments where they could avoid social criticism, but also work 
in peace. In this light, their letters, like all letters, were bridges between 
presence and absence, filling the gaps of a long distance relationship, but also 
opening up channels of communication that sustained political action in 
concert. ‘…during the Schippel campaign your letters stimulated my thinking 
day by day’5 Luxemburg wrote to Jogiches from Berlin on her birthday, 6 
March, 1899.  Her birthday present was a book and she was thrilled about it: 
‘you can’t imagine how happy your present made me. Rodbertus is my favorite 
economist. I can read him over and over again for sheer intellectual pleasure. I 
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feel it’s not a book I got but an estate, a house or a piece of land.’6 Politics 
and love are thus intertwined in their real and epistolary relationship; what 
also emerges from these letters is the frustration of not living together:  
 
I felt happiest about the part of your letter in which you wrote that we 
are both still young and able to arrange our personal life. Oh, Dyodyo, 
my golden one, if only you keep your promise! … Our own small 
apartment, our own nice furniture, our own library; quiet and regular 
work, walks together, an opera from tine to time, a small, very small, 
circle of friends who can sometimes be invited for dinner; every year a 
summer vacation in the country, one month with absolutely no work! … 
And perhaps even a little, a very little baby? Will this never be allowed? 
Never?7 
 
There is a range of very interesting themes in the above epistolary extract, 
which I will discuss later in the chapter. What I want to highlight here is the 
forceful way that the letter above portrays a relationship bursting with 
tensions, not just in terms of the political struggles Luxemburg and Jogiches 
were actively involved in, but also in terms of different life orientations that 
went on till the very end, 1907 when they finally broke up, although their 
political relationship continued till the end of their lives. In 1914 they 
established an underground political organization, The Spartakus Lead, wrote 
articles and organized activities against the war. While Luxemburg was in 
prison between 1915 and 1918, Jogiches looked after her ‘and was constantly 
at her side.’ (Ettinger, 1987: 191) After the crash of the Spartakist Rising in 
Berlin and Luxemburg’s murder in January 1919, Jogiches ignored warnings and 
stayed on determined to reveal the crime of the Freicorps forces; he was 
murdered three months later in March 1919. 
 
 
Luxemburg’s ur-epistolaria: Lost in Translation? 
 
Having outlined a rough sketch of the historical and socio-political milieu of the 
Luxembourg-Jogiches correspondence, I now want to look into the 
methodological limitations of its narrative analysis, which draws on Elżbieta 
Ettinger’s (1979) edited and translated collection of Luxemburg’s letters. There 
are two issues to be considered here: first the limitations of an edited 
publication where ‘the selection of some letters entails the deselection of 
many more’ (Stanley, 2004: 205); and second the thorny issue of being ‘lost in 
translation’ (Hoffman, 1998). Careful and attentive as it is, Ettinger’s 
collection is the inevitable effect of certain editorial decisions since it only 
includes a hundred and three letters out of the one thousand extant letters 
from Luxemburg to Jogiches, published in Polish in three volumes. To make 
things worse, Jogiches’ letters to Luxemburg have not been preserved or 
found, so in any case it is only one side of the correspondence that any analysis 
can draw upon.8  
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Without downplaying this important limitation in analysing Luxembourg’s 
letters, which have been translated and published in English, I have to note 
that ‘wholeness’ is never achievable even when working with unpublished 
archival documents. ‘You find nothing in the Archive but stories caught half 
way through: the middle of things: discontinuities’, Carolyn Steedman has 
influentially written (2001: 45). In this light the letter that was kept in the 
archive, should always be read with the letter that was lost or destroyed in 
mind and in the same way that we interpret voices, we should perhaps start 
interpreting silences or somehow include them in our archives. Liz Stanley has 
further proposed the notion of the ‘epistolarium’ to address questions around 
the already, always ‘incomplete state’ of different collections of letters and 
correspondences. In Stanley’s configuration there are three ways that an 
epistolarium can be defined: ‘as as an epistolary record that remains for post 
hoc scrutiny; as “a collection” of the entirety of the surviving correspondences 
that a particular letter writer was involved in; and as the ‘ur-letters’ produced 
in transcribing, editing and publishing actual letters (or rather versions of 
them).’ (2004: 218) Clearly, it is Luxembourg’s ‘ur-letters’ that this chapter is 
dealing with. 
 
As already noted above, the problem of translation is the second serious 
limitation of this chapter, since as Ettinger carefully notes ‘the Polish language 
of love with its wealth of tender, intimate words, and the possibility of 
creating words, inimitable words, private, yet understandable to an outsider, 
cannot be adequately translated into English’ (1979: ix). Indeed the problem of 
translation poses significant challenges to the whole field of narrative research 
and there is a growing body of literature and scholarship activity addressing 
these issues.9 Amongst the many interesting themes that this burgeoning body 
of scholarship has revolved around, I will take up the notion of ‘the author’s 
function’ that Foucault (1998) has most influentially theorised, namely the way 
the status of the author creates entanglements of power/knowledge discourses 
and practices that condition the reception of his/her work. What I want to 
suggest in this light is that Luxemburg’s letters are always, already read in the 
discursive context of her political and scientific writings: the readers of her 
letters are more likely to be informed by the controversial discourses 
surrounding her theories about capitalism and the revolution than by the 
translator’s recontextualisation practices. As Annelies Laschitza has pithily 
noted in the introduction of the German edition of Luxemburg’s letters: ‘the 
process by which the letters were tracked down, gathered together, and 
published is a turbulent and eventful story in its own right.’ (Adler, Hudis and 
Laschitza, 2011: xxii) What Foucault theorised then as ‘the author’s function’ 
can here be extended to ‘the editors’ function’; indeed the publication, 
translation and interpretation of Luxemburg’s letters need to be considered in 
the light of a sociology of publishing, translating and interpreting, a field that 
has been greatly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1994) insights in the social 
conditions of the international circulation of cultural goods. 
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What should further be considered vis-à-vis Luxemburg’s edited letters is the 
fact that Ettinger is not just a critical translator, but also Luxemburg’s 
biographer, whose feminist interpretation of Luxemburg’s life (1986) has 
created its own circle of turbulence around the validity of personal and 
intimate details in the writing of political and intellectual biographies. As the 
historian of the Second International, James Joll put it in his review of 
Ettinger’s biography: ‘it is both pathetic and ironic to see the famous Marxist 
revolutionary writing to her love, “I’ve two vases with violets on the table and 
a pink lampshade … and new gloves, and a new hairbrush and I am pretty.” ’ 
(cited in Dabakis, 1988: 20). Ettinger has thus been criticised for allowing ‘a 
rosy’ or maybe ‘violet’ Rosa to emerge, a vulnerable woman who liked pink 
lampshades and wanted ‘a little baby’, while writing and fighting for the 
revolution. In the same vein of rejecting the personal as insignificant to the 
political Stephen Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers, has 
introduced his volume of Luxemburg’s letters noting that: ‘choosing the letters 
was no easy task … much of Luxemburg’s correspondence is purely personal in 
character or concerns itself with the details of everyday life and the petty 
infighting of party politics; these letters I also chose to exclude’. (1993: x) In 
thus editing Luxemburg’s letters, Bronner chose to exclude what would be most 
interesting for a narrative analyst: narratives of everyday life in their forceful 
interrelation with the master political narratives of their times. Why is that? It 
is in the minutiae of personal narratives that the political is fleshed out and 
enacted, while theoretical ideas are grounded and become specific. As Arendt 
has aptly put it: ‘I have always believed that, no matter how abstract our 
theories may sound or how consistent our arguments appear, there are 
incidents and stories behind them, which […] contain as in a nutshell the full 
meaning of whatever we have to say.’ (1960: 1) 
 
What I have tried to show so far is that the problem of translation is always 
complicated and embedded in material and discursive situations that have to 
be considered in relation to a specific research problem. In this light, the 
restrictions of translation notwithstanding, my analysis is not placed in the 
field of literary criticism and it is not so much focused on the form of 
Luxemburg’s letters but rather on the discourses, power relations and forces of 
desire that traverse the themes that I analyse. In presenting and discussing 
some of the epistemological limitations in the analysis of political narratives in 
general and Luxemburg’s letters in particular, I still think that Luxemburg’s 
edited and translated letters constitute a rich ‘narrative assemblage’.10 Seen as 
an assemblage, Luxemburg’s edited and translated letters illuminate and 
concretize intrinsic and subtle relations between politics and love within the 
web of human relations. Rethinking these relations in the light of possibilities 
for communication that letter writing enacts is a relatively neglected area, 
which I will further discuss in the final section of this chapter. What I want to 
do now is to look into the Arendt/Luxemburg encounter in the light of love as 
an existential concept linked to memory, natality and plurality.  
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 Love, Memory, Politics 
 
There were only two women amongst eight men in Arendt’s (1968) influential 
work Men in Dark Times: the legendary storyteller, Isak Dinesen and the 
revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg. In the preface of this influential work, Arendt 
has clearly explained her choice of the lives included in this collection: 
 
That even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some 
illumination, and that such illumination may well come less from theories 
and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering and often weak light that 
some men and women, in their lives and their works, will kindle under 
almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given them 
on earth—this conviction is the inarticulate background against which 
these profiles were drawn. (Arendt, 1968: ix) 
 
Arendt thus chose Luxemburg as a woman whole life illuminated ‘dark times’. 
Apart from reading Luxemburg’s theoretical work, Arendt had admired the 
poetry and lyricism of her letters, but she had also developed visceral 
connections with Luxemburg, who was her mother’s heroine according to her 
biographer. (Young-Bruehl, 1982: 239) As the latter notes, Arendt was eleven 
years old ‘when her mother took her to the Königsberg demonstrations in 
support of the Spartacists’ (124). What she did not know at the time was that 
her future husband Heinrich Blücher—twenty years old at the time—was 
amongst the young Spartacists marching against the First World War in Berlin. 
(125)  
 
Arendt had thus heard many anecdotes about Luxembourg not only through the 
social democratic circles that her mother was involved in, but also later in life 
from Blücher himself, who had read and admired Luxemburg’s political 
writings. In thus reflecting upon the light of Luxemburg’s life, Arendt has 
particularly considered and discussed her relationship with Jogiches, ‘a man of 
action and passion [who] knew how to do and how to suffer.’ (45) As Young-
Bruehl has noted, in discussing both the amorous and the political part of the 
Luxemburg-Jogiches relationship, Arendt was somehow reflecting on her own 
experiences. When she wrote that ‘in marriage it is not always easy to tell the 
partners’ (1968: 46) thoughts apart, Arendt inevitably drew upon her own 
intellectual and marital relationship with Blücher;11 when she commented that 
‘this generation still believed firmly that love strikes only once’ (45) she must 
have had her mother’s generation in mind.  
 
Love was indeed at the heart of Arendt’s interest, the topic of her doctoral 
thesis having been the concept of love in St Augustine’s thought (Arendt, 
1996), while Rachel Varnhagen’s life (Arendt, 2000), the topic of her 
habilitation, particularly considered and discussed Varnhagen’s failure in 
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‘matters of love’. But why was love so important in the thought of such a 
distinguished political theorist? Leaving aside Arendt’s personal ties with Martin 
Heidegger,12 I want to examine here love as a crucial concept in her existential 
philosophy and her political theories.  
 
Arendt’s thesis ‘Love and St Augustine’ was her last book-length manuscript to 
be published in English in 1996. This publication came twenty-one years after 
her death, although a synopsis of the dissertation in English was included as an 
appendix of Young-Bruehl’s intellectual biography, Hannah Arendt, For Love of 
the World in 1982. The thesis was first translated in English by E.B. Ashton in 
1960 and although Arendt worked on the draft translation with a publication in 
mind, the idea was put on hold in 1965 as she was involved in other projects. 
Although never realised, what Arendt’s editorial intention indicates according 
to the editors of the posthumous publication, is that her thesis on Augustine 
remained central in the development of her political theories and that there 
should be no separation between the early writer of a philosophical thesis on 
love and the political writings of her maturity. ‘The return to Augustine 
directly infused her revisions of the Origins of Totalitarianism, her new study 
On Revolution, the essays collected in Between Past and Future and Eichman in 
Jerusalem with explicit and implicit Augustinian references.’ (Scott and Stark, 
1996: x) 
 
Moreover Augustine’s thought is critical in how Arendt (1978) develops her 
section on ‘the faculty of the Will and by implication to the problem of 
Freedom’ (1978: 3) in her posthumously published work The Life of the Mind. 
Love in Arendt’s configuration binds together the three faculties of the mind, 
namely thinking, willing and judging. As Young-Bruehl has noted, we think 
since we love meaning and the search for truth, we will the pleasure that the 
continuation of things can offer and we judge within the disinterested love that 
the image of the beautiful can offer us. In referring to the ‘dsinterested love’ 
Arendt drew on Kant’s notion of the ‘enlarged mentality’: ‘an image of judging 
as a disinterested love … put together with the image of thinking as an eros for 
meaning and the image of willing, transformed into love, willing objects to 
continue being.’ (Young-Bruehl, 1994: 356, emphasis in the text) But this 
recurrence of love as a concept binding the three faculties of the mind derives 
from the emergence of love as an effect of the Augustinian journey of memory, 
which I will now discuss. 
 
In the quest of meaning for ourselves and our relationship to the world, the 
future cannot offer us any hope since it is directed to death a certain point 
that defines the temporality of human existence, as influentially theorised by 
Heidegger (2003). Thus, Arendt’s turn to Augustine’s philosophy of time, also 
marked her departure from Heidegger’s orientation to death, a rupture that 
she wrote explicitly about:  
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Since our expectations and desires are prompted by what we remember 
and guided by a previous knowledge, it is memory and not expectation 
(for instance the expectation of death as in Heidegger’s approach) that 
gives unity and wholeness to human existence.’ (Arendt, 1996: 56)  
 
In seeking fearlessness through love, Augustine’s philosophy offers a different 
image of time, which comes from the future and is directed towards the past, 
the moment of the beginning of the world, which is also related to our own 
beginning, namely our birth. This image of time can be humanly conceptualized 
through memory: ‘Time exists only insofar as it can be measured, and the 
yardstick by which we measure it is space’ (Arendt, 1996: 15). For Augustine 
then, memory is the space wherein we measure time, but what we can 
measure is only what remains fixed in memory from the ‘no more’ and what 
exists as expectation from the ‘not yet’. As Arendt eloquently puts it: ‘It is only 
by calling past and future into the presence of remembrance and expectation 
that time exists at all.’ (ibid.)  
 
Love is crucial in the experience of the timeless Now: while for Augustine it is 
the love for God that can make humans forget their temporal existence over 
eternity, forgetfulness Arendt notes ‘is by no means only characteristic of the 
love of God.’ (ibid: 28) In loving ‘[man] not only forgets himself, but in a way 
[he] ceases to be [himself], that is this particular place in time and space. [He] 
loses the human mode of existence, which is mortality, without exchanging for 
the divine mode of existence, which is eternity.’ (ibid.)  
By illuminating the present, the timeless space between the ‘no longer’ and 
the ‘not yet’, Arendt highlights natality as the defining aspect of human 
temporality and is concerned with politics as an arena where new beginnings 
are always possible as history has so forcefully shown: ‘the essence of all, and 
in particular of political action is to make a new beginning’ (1994: 321).  
 
Thus, while the final destination of Augustine’s memory journey is God, 
Arendt’s chosen destination is humanity, the remembrance of what binds us 
together, namely our birth in the world, ‘for the sake of novitas’ (1996: 55) 
and therefore freedom. Having retreated from the world in the quest for 
meaning we thus follow an Augustinian journey of memory from the future into 
the past and by reaching our birth as a common experience that binds us as 
humans we reconcile ourselves with the world and through the experience of 
neighbourly love, ‘as an expression of interdependence’ (Arendt, 1996: 104), 
we reposition ourselves in-the-world-with-others. Love is thus an existential 
concept in Arendt’s political thought that binds together the two crucial 
components of her philosophy: uniqueness and plurality. In the conclusion of 
her important essay ‘What is Existential Philosophy’ she famously notes:  
 
Existence itself is by nature never isolated. It exists only in 
communication and in awareness of others’ existence. Our fellow-men 
are not (as in Heidegger) an element of existence that is structurally 
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necessary but at the same time an impediment to the Being of Self. Just 
the contrary: Existence can develop only in the shared life of human 
beings inhabiting a given world common to them all. (1994: 186) 
 
It was the image of ‘a given world common to all’ that Arendt was visualizing 
when she wrote Rachel Varnhagen’s life; in doing this she was able to flesh out 
the existential concept of love through writing Varnhagen’s life ‘from within’, 
reading her diaries and following her correspondence. But what does it mean 
‘to write from within’? Since every human being is unique in Arendt’s 
philosophy, all lives can inspire stories that will generate meaning and trigger 
further action, enthusing human beings to actually live their lives as a story. In 
reflecting on Isak Dinesen’s13 philosophy of storytelling, Arendt therefore asks: 
‘If it is true […] that no one has a life worth thinking about whose lifestory 
cannot be told, does it not then follow that life could be, even ought to be, 
lived as a story, that what one has to do in life is to make the story come true?’ 
(1968:105)  
 
Arendt’s idea that lives should be lived as stories is indeed a unique and strong 
political argument, bringing agency and the possibility of intervening in the 
politics of life to the fore. But here again she was very careful to clarify that 
living life as a story should not mean that one creates a normative pattern that 
has to be followed. The Arendtian imaginary of ‘life as a narrative’ (Kristeva, 
2001) is about creating conditions of possibility that will eventually allow the 
story to emerge. And although everybody can or should live their life as a story, 
Arendt notes that ‘certain people are so exposed in their own lives that they 
become junction points and concrete objectifications of life.’  (Weissberg, 
2000: 31) In this light, biographical subjects can become inspiring examples 
that move beyond their actuality and transcend their historicity. It is therefore 
the responsibility of the biographer to write about a life, creating forceful 
connections between life histories and the discourse of history. As Weisseberg 
has commented, ‘biography reflects on an individual life, but this life becomes 
public for history.’ (18) This is how ‘writing from within’ becomes Arendt’s 
biographical mode. By following Varnhagen’s letters and diaries Arendt could 
participate in her biographical subject’s actions and thoughts without the need 
to psychologize her. In thus writing Varnhagen’s biography, Arendt looked at 
the shape of a life that had been completed and responded to it with 
intellectual rigour and unbounded passion: as her biographical subject, 
Varnhagen would ultimately become for Arendt, ‘my closest friend, though she 
has been dead for some hundred years.’ (in Weissberg 2000: 5) It is this 
biographical mode of ‘writing from within’ that brings the discussion back to 
Luxemburg’s letters and the possibilities they open up for love and politics to 
be theorized in concert.   
 
 
Dear Dyodyo 
 
 9 
[…] Dyodyo, if only you’d settle your citizenship, finish your doctorate, 
live with me openly in our own home. We will both work and our life will 
be perfect!! […]we will be happy, we must. Weren’t we happy when just 
the two of us lived and worked together? […] Remember when we are 
alone in harmony, we can do without the whole world? …  Remember, 
last time in Weggis when I was writing ‘Step by Step’ […] I was sick 
writing in bed, all upset, and you were so gentle, so good, sweet. […] I 
will never forget it. Or do you remember the afternoons at Melida, after 
lunch, when you sat on the porch, drinking black thick coffee […] Or do 
you remember, how once a band of musicians came on a Sunday to the 
garden […] and we went on foot to Maroggia and we came back on foot, 
and the moon was rising[…] and we had just been talking about my going 
to Germany. We stopped, held each other on the road in the darkness 
and looked at the crescent moon over the mountains. Do you remember? 
I still smell the night’s air […] Or, do you remember how you used to 
come back from Lugano at 8:20 at night, with the groceries […] then I 
unpacked them and put the oranges, the cheese, salami, the cake on the 
table. Oh, you know, we have probably never had such magnificent 
dinners as those, on the little table in that bare room, the door to the 
porch open, the fragrance of the garden sweeping in […] And from afar 
in the darkness the train to Milan was flying over the bridge […] 
Dyodyo dearest […] I don’t want to write about business today—
tomorrow, after seeing Kautsky […] 
Yours Roza.14 
 
 
Amongst the many things that struck me in reading Luxemburg’s letter above is 
the recurrence of the ‘do you remember’ question. Written on the day of her 
birthday, the reiteration of the need to remember in the author’s epistolary 
discourse becomes particularly significant in the light of Arendt’s existential 
concept of love and its link to memory, natality and politics as discussed in the 
previous section. It is by recalling past [and scarce] moments of living together 
with the beloved—who is also a comrade and a political mentor—that 
Luxemburg’s amorous discourse unfolds. What is further important is that 
memories of the crescent moon, the train passing by in the darkness, simple 
dinners in the Italian countryside and worries about Kautsky’s reception of her 
work, the ordinary and the extraordinary, are crammed together in the bodies 
of these letters. 
 
In discussing the discourse of remembrance in amorous epistolary narratives, 
Linda Kauffmann (1986: 17) has noted that retrieving past moments of 
happiness in the text of the letter is an amorous epistolary practice that goes 
back to Ovid’s Heroids.  But while the Ovidean heroine writes to the beloved 
recalling past moments of happiness—since writing is the only act that can 
revert the position of ‘the deserted woman’—there is a significant inflection in 
Luxemburg’s epistolary practices: the memory of blissful moments of being 
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goes hand in hand with the memory of political creation and action: the period 
when she was writing ‘the little masterpiece’ Step by Step or working with The 
Administrative Theory Notes. Luxemburg is not ‘a deserted woman’—although 
sometimes she feels so by Jogiches’ indifference—but a political actor, who 
wants to change the world not just on the macro level but also in the minutiae 
of everyday life. In this light she actively seeks and claims the pleasure and 
right of being happy: ‘we will be happy, we must’, she notes emphatically in 
the birthday letter above.  
 
But for Luxemburg the often controversial and ambiguous image of ‘a happy 
life’ is interwoven in the web of political relations in a mutual co-dependence. 
A ‘happy life’ for Luxemburg is about loving, studying, writing, acting; as a 
revolutionary she wants them all and she wants them in the Now that she 
reflects upon and wills to revolutionize and radically change. In tracing signs of 
the author’s expression of a forceful will, the reader of these letters cannot 
but make connections with Arendt’s configuration of love as an existential 
force that binds together thinking, willing and judging in Luxemburg’s ‘life of 
the mind’. Luxemburg’s Now is Arendt’s timeless present, a site of struggle, 
but also a region par excellence for thinking and remembering: ‘The gap 
between past and future opens only in reflection [which] draws these absent 
“regions” into the mind’s presence; from that perspective the activity of 
thinking can be understood as a fight against time itself.’ (1978: 206)  
 
Luxemburg’s letters I argue open up possibilities of communication about 
politics, the revolution and the lovers’ life in a future that is radical and open.  
In this light the unbearable heaviness of being separated from the beloved was 
not just a contingency of the amorous relationship; while visualizing a different 
world, Luxemburg was specifically situating her life within it. Her letters to 
Jogiches are thus creating tangible links between the particular and the 
universal. In reflecting upon the unhappiness of her own life, she was departing 
from the abstractness of political discourse. Although accepting the 
fragmentation of the world, through her letters, Luxemburg was attempting ‘to 
accommodate the modern sense of alienation in the world and the modern 
desire to create, in a world that is no longer a home to us, a human world that 
could become our home.’ (Arendt, 194: 186) In doing this Luxemburg was 
continuously confronted with different ideas and perspectives: not just those of 
the social democratic circles she was refuting and in which she was acting in 
concert with Jogiches, but also with those of the beloved. Her letters to 
Jogiches stage a scene of an on-going struggle of ideas and perspectives—not so 
much about politics but mostly about love-in-politics—that would remain open 
till the very end.  
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In this chapter I have argued that Luxemburg’s letters to her lover and comrade 
Jogiches create an interesting archive wherein the epistolary form dramatizes 
and gives specificity to the relationship between politics and love. Luxemburg’s 
letters have been read as political narratives: tangible traces of the 
contingency of action and the unpredictability of the human condition, 
constitutive of politics and of the discourse of History. In acting and speaking 
together, human beings expose themselves to each other, reveal the 
uniqueness of who they are and through taking the risk of disclosure, they 
connect with others. In this light narration creates conditions of possibility for 
uniqueness, plurality and communication to be enacted within the Arendtian 
configuration of the political. Love as an effect of the journey of memory and 
as a force of life is crucial here: through love we reconnect with the moment of 
our beginning, thus becoming existentially aware of freedom as an inherent 
possibility of the human condition.  
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1 Rosa Luxemburg to Leo Jogiches, July 16th, 1897, (in Ettinger, 1979: 22) 
2 Rosa Luxemburg’s life has been the topic of two main biographies and several 
biographical sketcehes. See amongst others, Nettl 1966, Ettinger 1982. For an 
interesting discussion of the battleground around Luxembourg’s political and 
theoretical work see Arendt 1993. 
3 In 1893, Luxemburg and Jogiches founded together the first influential Polish 
Marxist workers’ party, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP), 
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which was reorganized in 1900 as the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of 
Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL). See Ettinger 1979: 2-3, 195-196. 
4 Rosa Luxemburg to Leo Jogiches, (in Ettinger, 1979: 71). 
5 Ettinger, 1979: 72.  
6 Ibid., 71-72. 
7 Ibid., 73-74. 
8 I have also studied the following collections of Luxemburg’s letters:  Bronner 
1993, Paul 1923 and Adler, Hudis and Laschitza 2011, but for the sake of 
consistency in the problem of the translation I have only quoted from Ettinger’s 
collection (1979). 
9 See Hoffman’s classic Lost in Translation. (1998) See also, Temple 2008 for an 
excellent overview of questions and issues around translation in narrative 
research. 
10 This a notion that I have used in my work to denote multifarious and 
disorderly collections of storylines that are put together by the researcher in 
the process of creating an archive of the problem s/he is investigating. (see 
Tamboukou, 2010)  
11 See Young-Bruehl, 1982: 135. 
12 See Young-Bruehl 1982 and Ettinger 1995. 
13  Isak Dinesen was the male pseudonym of Karen Blixen. See Arendt 1968: 95-
109. 
14 Rosa Luxemburg to Leo Jogiches, (in Ettinger 1979: 73-75). 
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